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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether emigrants from MENA coun-
tries self-select on cultural traits such as religiosity and gender-egalitarian
attitudes. To do so, we use Gallup World Poll data on individual opinions and
beliefs, migration aspirations, short-run migration plans, and preferred des-
tination choices. We find that individuals who intend to emigrate to OECD,
high-income countries exhibit significantly lower levels of religiosity than the
rest of the population. They also share more gender-egalitarian views, al-
though the effect only holds among the young (aged 15 to 30), among single
women, and in countries with a Sunni minority. For countries mostly affected
by Arab Spring, since 2011 the degree of cultural selection has decreased.
Nevertheless, the aggregate effects of cultural selection should not be over-
estimated. Overall, self-selection along cultural traits has limited (albeit non
negligible) effects on the average characteristics of the population left behind,
and on the cultural distance between natives and immigrants in the OECD
countries.
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1 Introduction
Human capital and cultural traits are proximate drivers of modernization, economic growth,
and democracy. Hence, factors that affect human capital accumulation and the distribution
of cultural traits have persistent effects on economic and political outcomes. International
migration is one of these factors, and the existing literature has long emphasized that
migrants self-select along educational levels (see, among others, Docquier et al. (2007);
Grogger and Hanson (2011); Belot and Hatton (2012)). On the contrary, migrants’ selec-
tion along cultural traits, beliefs and practices has been largely understudied. Focusing
on the MENA countries, this paper tackles this issue and tests whether migration aspi-
rations, short-run plans to emigrate and preferred destination choices are influenced by
cultural traits. We focus on religiosity and attitudes towards women’s rights, two traits that
are correlated with economic outcomes and for which MENA countries exhibit distinctive
distributions.
We use the Gallup World Poll microdata and extract 12 questions on opinions and be-
liefs, as well as question on migration aspirations, on plans to emigrate within 12 months,
and on individual characteristics. Using a double principal component analysis (PCA),
we identify four cultural indicators and normalize them between zero and one. Among
them, religiosity and gender-egalitarian attitudes are the only ones being correlated with
income per capita. Focusing on these two cultural traits, we then investigate (i) whether
cultural traits affect the aspirations and plans to emigrate over the 2007-2016 period, (ii)
whether selection on culture varies across group of respondents and with country-specific
characteristics, and (iii) whether the selection intensity has changed after the Arab Spring.
We show that aspiring migrants from the MENA and individuals with concrete migration
plans are culturally self-selected, and that this selection along cultural traits depends on
the preferred destination choice. Intended migrants to OECD, high-income countries ex-
hibit significantly lower levels of religiosity than intended non-migrants. As far as attitude
towards women’s rights are concerned, aspiring migrants to OECD countries have more
gender-egalitarian views in the age group 15-30, when they are single women, or when
they originate from countries with a Sunni minority. Finally, we find a robust effect of the
Arab Spring on the intensity of cultural selection, but only in countries highly impacted by
the Arab Spring. In these countries, the Arab Spring has decreased the degree of cultural
selection. Given the high correlation between aspirations and actual migration flows, our
results indicate that emigration to OECD countries potentially impacts the distribution of
cultural traits among those left behind. However, the aggregate effects of cultural selection
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should not be overestimated. First, self-selected emigration hardly affects the distribution
of cultural traits in the MENA countries. Second, it has a limited (albeit non negligible)
effect on the cultural distance between natives and immigrants in the OECD countries.
It is worth stressing that our analysis does not make any value judgment about specific
cultural traits, and does not argue that cultural differences should be combated or that a
set of traits dominates others. Culture shapes the utility function of people, implying that
comparisons of economic outcomes do not reflect comparisons in welfare. This is evi-
denced in Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015), who show that religious practices in
Muslims’ countries (as measured by the length of the Ramadan fasting period) have neg-
ative implications for economic performance, but increase subjective wellbeing among the
followers. Nevertheless, there are several reasons that justify focusing on cultural selec-
tion in general, and on selection by religiosity and by gender-egalitarian views in particular.
First, cultural selection is one of the main mechanisms through which emigration affects
the distribution of cultural traits in the population left behind. If not compensated by ex-post
transfers of norms and beliefs from destination to origin countries,1 selection on gender-
egalitarian attitudes is likely to impact effective gender inequality, which is repulsive in its
own rights. In the same vein, the distribution of cultural traits may affect the openness to
innovation and the modernization potential of the origin country. Second, cultural selec-
tion may increase the cultural distance between poor and rich countries, which has been
seen as a brake on technology diffusion and on the transmission of democratic values.
Third, cultural selection is a key determinant of the cultural distance between migrants
and host-country citizens, therefore determining the level of cultural diversity at destina-
tion, opinions towards immigration, and migrants’ capacity to assimilate. The literature on
these potential mechanisms has been growing rapidly for the last decade or so.
The idea of culture being an important determinant of economic development levels
probably starts with Weber’s theory of the Protestant work ethic (Weber (1946)). Culture
is seen as a key determinant of individual effort and the overall quality of the institutions
that support market friendly exchange. Recent works have produced sound economet-
ric tests of the link between economic outcomes and culture, often using opinion survey
data as a means of measuring cultural elements such as economic beliefs (Piketty (1995);
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2014)), trust (Knack and Keefer (1997)), etc. The relationship
1Rapoport et al. (2017) study such transfers of norms. Investigating which of these two effects (i.e., the
ex-ante self-selection of migrants, and the ex-post transfers of norms) dominates is beyond the scope of this
paper, which solely focuses on the first selection mechanism. To the best of our knowledge there is only
one recent study which analyzes the reverse effect of emigration on cultural traits in the MENA countries by
Bouoiyour and Miftah (2017).
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between culture and economic performances has been recently investigated in the Arab
context (Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011); Kostenko et al. (2017); Diwan and Tzannatos
(2017); Kuran (2012)). More related to our work, recent studies focus on the link between
views on gender inequalities, religiosity and growth. As far as gender-egalitarian attitudes
are concerned, they play a key role in explaining effective discriminations (Bergh (2007);
Baxter and Kane (1995)), and the resulting gender inequalities in health, education, politi-
cal empowerment and employment have long been seen as major barriers to human and
economic development (UN (2015); Duflo (2012)). As for religiosity, Benabou et al. (2015)
identify a negative association with individual openness to innovation and with effective
patents per capita.2 Chase (2014) finds a negative association with economic growth,
despite the fact that religiosity tends to reduce the level of corruption. Price (2015) shows
that MENA countries hold significantly less egalitarian attitudes toward women’s employ-
ment and specific levels of religiosity compared to those in all other nations sampled, even
after controlling for natural resources. She argues that the negative correlation between
religiosity and gender-egalitarian views is magnified among individuals living in the MENA.
Moreover, the renewed upturn of patriarchal views due to the recent rise of political Islam
intensified gender inequality in the MENA context (Tzannatos (1999); Alexander Welzel
(2011); Norris and Inglehart (2011); El Mikawy et al. (2017); Stetter (2008)).
Other contributions have highlighted the implications of cultural distance between coun-
tries for the speed of technology adoption (e.g. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2012)) and for
the democracy transition (e.g. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014)). In their study on the diffu-
sion of economic development, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) measure the relatedness
between populations using a proxy for cultural distance (based on the probability that two
randomly drawn individuals from the two populations share identical genes). They show
that genetic distance captures barriers to the diffusion of development, as similarity in
genetic traits would tend to facilitate communication and understanding, and hence the
diffusion and adaptation of complex technological and institutional innovations. Desmet
et al. (2011) document that European populations that are genetically closer give more
similar answers to a set of 430 questions about norms, values, and cultural characteristics
included in the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey (Sections on perceptions of life,
family, religion, and morals). Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) support the same conclusion
using a larger set of countries: on average, populations that are more closely genetically
related tend to be more similar with respect to traits (habits, customs, beliefs, values, etc.)
2It is worth reminding that religion and religiosity are two different concepts. Noland (2005) does not find
any negative relation between the share of Muslims in the population and economic performance.
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and share closer technological and political characteristics.
Finally, migrants’ selection on culture determines the level of cultural diversity in the
host country. Although diversity induces beneficial effects on the host country (Ottaviano
and Peri (2006); Alesina et al. (2016); Docquier et al. (2016)), several empirical stud-
ies show that immigrants’ economic outcomes at destination depend on the distance be-
tween their identity and the dominant norms (e.g., Pendakur and Pendakur (2005); Battu
and Zenou (2010); Casey and Dustmann (2010); Bisin et al. (2011); Islam and Raschky
(2013)). The effect is usually negative and its size is uncertain. Perceived cultural distance
is also the source of negative attitudes towards immigrants (Card et al. (2006)), leading to
discrimination, marginalization and exclusion from the economic, social and political life.
In particular, Islamophobia has been increasing in Western societies, and around 70% of
western natives think that tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds originate in
cultural and religious differences (Gallup (2010)).
Migrant selection on culture has potentially important effects on many economic out-
comes. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are very few papers investigating the
link between cultural traits and migration aspirations. Berlinschi and Harutyunyan (2016)
use data from the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) jointly collected by the European Bank
of Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in 2010. It covers around 39,000
households from 34 countries. They identify a positive correlation between migration aspi-
rations from Eastern European or post-Soviet countries and opinions about home-country
governance, political participation and trust in other people. More related to our analysis,
Myers (2000) finds that migration aspirations of US citizens are negatively correlated with
involvement in social activities related to religion. Hoffman et al. (2015) finds that external
religiosity (e.g., participating in religious activities) and internal religiosity (e.g., spiritual-
ity) induce different effects on migration aspirations of Roman Catholic Mexican students:
while external religiosity is negatively correlated with migration aspirations, internal reli-
giosity increases the desire to work and live in the US. Using the second (2010-11) and
third (2012-14) waves of the Arab Barometer for nine Islamic countries, Falco and Rotondi
(2016) focus on the role of radical Islam views measured by opinions about the use of
Islamic law in the formulation of penal, personal status and inheritance law. They find
that radical views are negatively correlated with migration aspirations. Our paper uses a
similar specification but focuses on different origin countries and on specific cultural traits
that are often considered as causing cultural tensions in Western societies.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 describes our data on
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migration aspirations and culture. The empirical specification is discussed in Section 3.
Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and stylized facts
We use microdata on migration aspirations, cultural traits and other individual characteris-
tics from the Gallup World Poll (GWP) surveys. Although GWP covers 148 countries, our
sample is limited to 17 MENA countries where Gallup conducted at least one wave of its
survey between the years 2007 and 2016.3 On average, the sample includes about 1,000
randomly selected respondents per year and per country. For the majority of countries in
our sample, the data are collected through face-to-face interviews. Exceptions are Iran
and Iraq, where interviews were mainly conducted through phone calls.4 The sampling
frame is such that GWP data are representative of the entire population aged 15 and over
(including populations from rural areas). Our full sample includes 146,680 respondents.
However, our analysis is conducted on the working age population only (i.e., individuals
aged 15 to 64).5
Measuring migration aspirations. – There is a large literature in sociology and demog-
raphy investigating the determinants of aspirations to migrate (among others, see Becerra
(2012); Drinkwater and Ingram (2009); Jónsson (2008); Wood et al. (2010)). Most of them
focus on a single country; they are hard to compare with each other or across countries.
The fact that the GWP database covers many countries makes it exceptional. As the data
are relatively new, the literature relying on these data to capture migration aspirations is
limited. Manchin et al. (2014) investigate the impact of individual satisfaction with local and
country-level amenities on the willingness to migrate internationally and locally. Dustmann
and Okatenko (2014) study the role of wealth constraints and local amenities in governing
migration intentions from sub-Saharan African countries. Docquier et al. (2014) and Dao
et al. (2016) study the determinants of migration aspirations after aggregating GWP data
by country pair and by education level. Docquier et al. (2015) use the GWP data to proxy
the number of potential migrants who could respond to an abolition of migration barriers.
Bertoli and Ruyssen (2016) quantify the effect of migrant networks on the migration as-
3Our sample of MENA countries excludes the Persian Gulf countries, which exhibit much greater levels
of income. It includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Chad, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen
4In these two countries, more than 80% of the population has a telephone land-line.
5Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are provided in appendix; see Tables A4 and A5.
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pirations and destination choices. Ruyssen and Salomone (2015) investigates whether
gender discrimination fosters women’s migration intentions.
The GWP includes several questions capturing migration aspirations, preferred desti-
nation choices, and whether individuals are actively taking steps to emigrate. The three
GWP questions used in this paper are the following:6
• Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another
country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?
• To which country would you like to move?
• Are you planning to move permanently to another country in the next 12 months, or
not?
We define as aspiring migrants those who answer the first question affirmatively. Note
that the last two questions are asked to aspiring migrants only. In line with Bertoli and
Ruyssen (2016), we find that migration aspirations are correlated with actual migration
flows. Using the annual flow data from the OECD International Migration Database, the
correlation with aspirations is positive (0.435) and significant at the 1% threshold. Hence,
patterns of migration aspirations are likely to be similar to the patterns of actual migration.
The average share of aspiring migrants in our sample is around 24%. Large varia-
tions exist across countries. Countries exhibiting the greatest shares of aspiring migrants
are Syria (35.6%), Jordan (27.6%) and Algeria (27.5%); countries exhibiting the smallest
shares are Niger (16.1%), Azerbaijan (18.3%) and Chad (17.9%). Cross-country vari-
ations in destination choices are even larger. Most MENA countries were colonized or
administered by European powers. Algeria, Chad, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, Syria and Tunisia were colonized or administered by France during the 19th and
20th centuries. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine and (South-)Yemen were colonized or
administered by the Great Britain. Azerbaijan proclaimed independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991. Due to cultural proximity and network effects, these historical ties are still
affecting the preferred destination of aspiring migants. On average, the share of aspiring
migrants who would like to emigrate to an OECD destination country equals 52.3%.7 The
latter share amounts to 90.9% in Morocco and to 86.7% in Algeria; it only equals 10% in
Yemen and 12.8% in Niger.
6In the GWP, these questions are coded wp1325, wp3120 and wp10252, respectively.
7Appendix A1 lists the top-5 desired destinations by country of origin, distinguishing between OECD and
non-OECD destinations.
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Measuring cultural traits. – Our objective is to test whether cultural traits affect the
aspiration to migrate. The GWP includes several questions on cultural norms, beliefs,
values and attitudes. To proxy cultural traits, we select 12 questions which cover different
aspects of the respondent’s cultural spectrum in the MENA region:
Q1 Have you donated money to a charity in the last past month?
Q2 Have you volunteered your time to an organization?
Q3 Have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help?
Q4 Is religion an important part of your daily life?
Q5 Have you attended a place of worship or religious service within the past seven
days?
Q6 Do you agree that women and men should have equal legal rights?
Q7 Do you agree that women should be allowed to hold any job for which they are
qualified outside the home?
Q8 Do you agree that women should have the right to initiate a divorce?
Q9 Do you think that for the military to target and kill civilians is sometimes justified?
Q10 Do you think that for an individual person or a small group of persons to target and
kill civilians is sometimes justified?
Q11 To which extent is it morally justified to sacrifice one’s life for what one believes in?
Q12 Do you believe that oppressed groups (suffering from injustice) can improve their
situation by peaceful means alone?
The first five questions are asked in all countries of the world. The seven others are
only asked in specific geographical regions. We normalize responses between 0 and 1,
giving the same order to questions belonging to the same area.8
8Being generous or spending time for others (Q1,Q2,Q3) is coded as 1, 0 otherwise. Sharing gender-
egalitarian views (Q6,Q7,Q8) is coded as a 1, while not sharing those values is coded as 0. Related to
religiosity (Q4,Q5), not being religious is coded as 1, while attending place of worship or thinking that religion
is an important part of your daily life is coded as 0. Not to justify violence (Q9,Q10) is coded as 1, 0 otherwise.
It is more difficult to rank Q11 and Q12; for these two questions, we use the GWP coding
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Several methods can be used to extract synthetic information on cultural traits.9 We
conduct a two-stage Principal Component Analysis (referred to as PCA henceforth). This
allows us highlighting common patterns across groups of respondents, and identifying
linear combinations of questions that explain the greatest share of heterogeneity in cultural
traits.10 We run the first stage of PCA on the entire set of questions. Figure 1(a) and
Table A3 in the Appendix show that the first two components combine five subsets of
questions in a similar way.11 The first set captures generosity (Q1, Q2 andQ3; relabeled as
Generosity 1, 2 and 3 on Figure 1(a)), the second one measures the degree of religiosity
(Q4 and Q5; relabeled as Religiosity 1 and 2), the third one includes questions on gender-
egalitarian attitudes (Q6, Q7 and Q8; relabeled as Gender 1, 2 and 3), the fourth one
relates to opinions about the use of violence (Q9 and Q10; relabeled as Violence 1 and 2),
and the fifth one includes Q11 and Q12 (relabeled as Other 1 and 2).
In the second stage, we drop Q11 and Q12, which cause a huge drop in the number of
observations. Although some questions were asked in all waves 2007-2016, the second
question on religiosity and all questions on gender-egalitarian attitudes are not avalail-
able after 2011. Our benchmark analysis is thus restricted to the period 2007-2011; we
consider alternative sets of questions covering the period 2007-2016 in the robustness
analysis. Then, for each component, we aggregate the responses using the values of the
eigenvectors as weights,12 and perform a second-stage PCA on the four synthetic indi-
cators. Figure 1(b) illustrates the composition of the first two components of the second-
stage PCA; it shows that it is irrelevant to go further in aggregating.
Table 1 reports the mean value of each indicator and for each country. Lebanon and
Azerbaijan are the most progressive in terms of gender-egalitarian attitudes.13 Iran and
Azerbaijan are the less religious countries.14 Iran, Afghanistan and Syria exhibit the high-
9For example, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) combine different sets of questions in order to create an
aggregate measure of culture. They use the Euclidean distance to aggregate question-specific differences
between groups of respondents.
10See Asselin (2002) or Tuccio et al. (2016).
11Table A3 in Appendix reports the values of the eigenvectors associated with each component.
12A similar technique is used in UN (2005).
13This may be due to the fact that Azerbaijan has a Soviet legacy on this point, and Lebanon has about
44% of Christians, making it a pluri-confessional society with 17 recognized religious denominations and
cultural groups (Karouby (2014)). Surprisingly, countries like Tunisia and Marocco with gender-egalitarian
institutions (Kammoun (2014 ); Sadiqi (2014)) are not the most gender-egalitarian countries.
14Moaddel and Azadarmaki (2002) indicate that Iranians are not more religious than other Middle Eastern
populations. Kashavarzian (2010) concludes that average levels of religiosity have remained constant com-
pared to the pre-1979 revolution period, and that participation in Friday prayers has declined. Reformists
that came into power in the 2000’s addressed many of the concerns of women. Women accessed the higher
education system and the labor market in large numbers. As a result female illiteracy declined substantially.
Enrollment of women in universities led to an increase in the age of first marriage. In the 1990s the popula-
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(a) First-stage PCA
(b) Second-stage PCA
Figure 1: Principal Component Analysis - Loadings plot
10
est levels of generosity. Four countries that experienced turmoil and riots during the Arab
Spring (i.e., Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen) hardly justify the use of violence. We refer
to these countries, with Syria, as the group of Main Insurgents.15 In these countries, a
large share of the population finds unjustifiable to use any kind of violence against civil-
ians. Finally, sub-Saharan African countries (Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger) exhibit a
high level of religiosity. The geographical distribution of these cultural traits is plotted in
Appendix A4.
It is worth noticing that GWP is not the only database documenting the distribution of
cultural traits. For example, several questions of the World Values Survey (WVS) can be
used to document beliefs and values. However, the WVS includes a smaller set of coun-
tries,16 and has no specific question on migration plans and aspirations. Still, some WVS
questions closely relate to our four indices of cultural traits, and their geographic distribu-
tions can be compared to those reported in Table 1. As far as reliogiosity is concerned,
the sixth wave of the WVS includes four questions: (i) How important in life is religion;
(ii) How often do you attend religious service?; (iii) How often do you pray?; (iv) Are you
a religious person? As for gender-egalitarian attitudes, the WVS includes two indicators
on gender-equality based on questions related to the role of women in the economy and
in politics.17 We normalize WVS responses between 0 and 1, using the same order as
before.18 Table 2 reports the the correlations between the country-specific mean levels
of our indicators and the of the WVS data. Our index of religiosity is highly correlated
with the WVS responses. Our gender-egalitarian index is poorly correlated with the WVS
tion growth rate declined in Iran due to a change in government policy in favor of family planning. Currently
Iranian women are more educated, marry later in life, have fewer children and work more outside of home,
aspiring to greater gender equality in the family and society (Kashavarzian (2010)). In Azerbaijan, the major
political forces are secular. The country has a high level of literacy and human development, a legacy of the
Soviet period.
15The uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria were triggered by rising unemployment over the years (espe-
cially for the young), the persistence of economic inequality, and rural-urban disparities. Elite governments
and a popular desire for freedom fueled growing bitterness. Economic and political frustrations of the as-
piring youth played an important role (Boughzala and Romdhane (2017)). In Syria authoritarian political
system and the mismanagement of the economy led to uprisings, that developed into a civil war eventu-
ally drawing both regional and international external armed interventions (Safadi and Neaime (2017)). The
possible persistence of authoritarism in those countries could be related to cultural factors (Elbadawi and
Makdisi (2017))
16As far as the MENA region is concerned, WVS data are available for the following countries: Algeria,
Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen.
17Those indicators came from the Secular and Emancipative Values Indicators included in the WVS, and
they build on several questions such as (i) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women?; (ii) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do? etc.
18Being religious takes value of 0, while not being religious value 1; sharing gender-egalitarian views is
associated with value 1, 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Cultural traits: mean levels by country
Countries Gender Religiosity Generosity Violence
Afghanistan 0.505 0.131 0.345 0.840
Algeria 0.734 0.204 0.225 0.926
Azerbaijan 0.847 0.609 0.275 0.809
Chad 0.768 0.091 0.245 0.808
Egypt 0.739 0.153 0.243 0.976
Iran 0.802 0.309 0.410 0.804
Iraq 0.596 0.276 0.327 0.936
Jordan 0.693 n.a. 0.233 0.805
Lebanon 0.854 0.279 0.323 0.872
Mali 0.643 0.139 0.233 0.788
Mauritania 0.686 0.120 0.279 0.804
Morocco 0.678 0.199 0.228 0.886
Niger 0.551 0.086 0.225 0.765
Palestine 0.687 0.234 0.194 0.914
Syria 0.671 0.225 0.355 n.a.
Tunisia 0.739 0.300 0.259 0.931
Yemen 0.677 0.199 0.177 0.945
All 0.692 0.266 0.230 0.860
Main Insurgents 0.714 0.244 0.230 0.944
Others 0.684 0.277 0.230 0.834
All the values in the table are the mean values of each indicator
Main Insurgents: Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.
index of economic equality. It is however nicely correlared with the WVS index of equality
in politics.
Correlates of cultural traits. – We finally investigate whether our proxies for cultural
traits are correlated with four macro indicators capturing the branch of Islam (Sunni or
Shia) that is prevalent in the origin country, the level of economic development, the quality
of institutions, and past migration flows. Data on the shares of Sunnis and Shiites in the
Muslim population are taken from the CIA World Factbook and from the PEW Research
Center; data on GDP per capita are obtained from the Maddison Project; data on the
control of corruption and on the rule of law are taken from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators of the World Bank; as for past migration, we compute the percentage of respon-
dents with a family member or a friend abroad from the GWP data (a proxy for migration
networks).
Correlation coefficients are reported in Table 3. Two main findings emerge from this
table. First, our index of religiosity is highly correlated with the composition of the Muslim
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Table 2: Correlation between GWP and WVS indices
Indicator Religiosity Gender
Important in life: religion 0.851*** -
Attending religious service 0.847*** -
Praying frequently 0.718** -
Religious Person 0.948*** -
Gender equality: job - 0.199
Gender equality: politics - 0.649**
Note: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup database, and World
Values Survey.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Countries: Alge-
ria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Pales-
tine, Tunisia and Yemen.
population. Countries with a greater share of Shiites are less religious than Sunni coun-
tries. Second, the level of development is highly correlated with religiosity and gender-
egalitarian attitudes, in line with the empirical literature on culture and economic growth
(see Duflo (2012); Benabou et al. (2015); Chase (2014)). On the contrary, the level of
development is not significantly correlated with generosity and with attitudes towards vio-
lence; and none of our cultural proxies is significantly correlated with the quality of institu-
tions or with the size of the network.19 For these reasons, the rest of our empirical analysis
mostly focuses on the role of gender-egalitarian attitudes and religiosity in shaping migra-
tion behaviors.
Table 3: Correlation between aggregate cultural values and macro indicators
Indicator Gender Religiosity Generosity Violence
Sunnis -0.291 -0.496* -0.336 0.421
Shiites 0.367 0.660*** 0.609*** -0.033
ln Gdp 0.648*** 0.679*** 0.223 0.280
Rule of Law 0.257 0.068 -0.376 0.079
Control Corr. 0.156 -0.091 -0.447* 0.085
Network 0.348 0.169 0.103 0.273
Note: Authors’ calculations based on the Gallup data, CIA World
Factbook, World Bank indicators, Maddison Project and UN
databases. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
19Only Generosity is correlated with a measure of control of corruption, but just at 10% level.
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3 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to analyze the determinants of migration aspirations, and to test whether these
aspirations are affected by cultural traits. This section describes the benchmark specifica-
tion used in our empirical analysis, and then discusses some econometric issues.
Benchmark specification. – Our benchmark empirical model features the intention to
migrate as the dependent variable. For respondent i originating from region r at year t,
the variable Migrationirt, takes a value of 1 if individual i expresses a desire to migrate
abroad permanently and 0 otherwise. Theoretically speaking, this decision results from
the comparison of expected utility levels across alternative locations (see Chort (2014)
and Ruyssen and Salomone (2015)). Hence, we control for a set of factors that influence
utility and moving costs. Given the nature of our data, we opt for a logit model:
Prob{Migrationirt = 1|Cultureirt, Xirt} = Φ{α + βCultureirt + ΓXirt} (1)
where Cultureirt is our proxy of cultural traits ranging from zero (when they do not share
gender-egalitarian views or when they are religious) to one; Xirt is a set of other determi-
nants of migration aspirations that vary across households or individuals; α , β and Γ are
the parameters to be estimated; the error terms are clustered at the country level.
The set of control variable includes: age, gender, marital status, the presence of chil-
dren in the household, the level of income per household member and its squared, the
education level (a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has least 9 years of
education), and the presence of a friend or relative abroad. These variables are denoted
by xirt, a subset of Xirt (as explained below). In line with the existing literature, these
variables affect the size of migration costs as well as the expected gains from migration.
We explain above that migration aspirations are correlated with actual migration flows,
in line with Bertoli and Ruyssen (2016). However, the number of aspiring migrants is much
greater than the number of actual migrants. Hence, cultural traits and other determinants
may affect realization rates, and may have heterogeneous effects on the desire to emigrate
and on the capacity to realize these aspirations. Hence, as a robustness check, we also
estimate Eq. (1) using migration plans (instead of migration aspirations) as a dependent
variable. This dependent variable takes a value of 1 if respondent i is actually making
steps to move to another country within 12 months, and 0 otherwise.20
20The question writes as: Are you planning to move permanently to another country in the next 12 month,
or not? It is only asked if the answer related to the intention to migrate is affirmative.
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Eq. (1) is estimated using the sample of working age respondents living in the 17
MENA countries, and using the main cultural proxies identified in Section 2 (i.e., the syn-
thetic indices of gender-egalitarian attitudes and religiosity). Remember we use a two-
stage PCA to proxy cultural traits. Alternative methods could be used to aggregate mul-
tiple questions on culture. Hence, we also estimate Eq. (1) using the arithmetic mean or
the geometric mean of the question-specific responses.21 In addition, our estimates can
be affected by the presence of immigrants in the sample; the latter are likely to exhibit
different characteristics, cultural traits and have different migration strategies (e.g., transit
immigrants). To keep the sample as homogenous as possible, we exclude the foreign born
from the sample and only consider native residents.
Our approach entails several methodological issues that might lead the logit model
to generate inconsistent estimates. In particular, we discuss below how we deal with
heterogeneous effects and with endogeneity problems.
Heterogeneous effects. – Migration patterns in general, and the role of cultural traits
in particular, may vary according to the regional context, to the choice of destination, or
to individual characteristics. To test for heterogeneity across countries of origin, we first
estimate Eq. (1) at the country level. Since we find large variations across countries,
we augment Eq. (1) with some country-specific variables and with their interaction with
cultural proxies. In line with Table 3, we account for the country shares of Sunnis and
Shiites among the Muslim population, for the log of GDP per capita, for two indicators of
institutional quality, and for the share of native citizens living in a OECD country member
state.
To test for heterogeneity across periods, we distinguish between the pre-Arab Spring
period and the subsequent years. The Arab Spring started in December 2010 in Tunisia
(with the attempted self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi); it triggered riots and politi-
cal unrest in several MENA countries in the subsequent months. Most economies were
adversely affected in the post-Arab Spring period. Investments collapsed, tourism and
exports declined, capital flight accelerated (especially in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia
and Yemen). In Syria, economic production declined significantly. Unemployment in-
creased throughout the region and economic growth was negative in Tunisia and Yemen
(Richards et al. (2014)). The Arab Spring may have impacted cultural norms and migration
intentions jointly. In particular, the political instability and the rise of authoritarianism that
characterize the post-Arab Spring period (sometimes referred to as as the Arab Winter)
21The results of these variants are presented in Table A7 in Appendix. We only consider migration aspi-
rations to OECD destination countries.
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may have affected the process of cultural selection of aspiring migrants.22 We exploit this
possible source of variation by focusing on the first GWP question on religiosity (see Q4
above); this question is asked in all years from 2007 to 2016. The correlation between
responses to Q4 and our synthetic indicator of religiosity is large (0.781) and highly signif-
icant.23 We then augment Eq. (1) with a dummy variable capturing the post-Arab Spring
period (i.e., a dummy equal to one for the years 2011 to 2016) and with its interaction with
religiosity. Note that we also distinguish between the full set of countries, the sample of
countries that were impacted by the Arab Spring,24 and the other MENA countries. In-
deed, the group of Main Insurgents may exhibit specific distributions of cultural traits and
migration aspirations.
At the individual level, we first investigate whether cultural selection is affected by the
intended destination of aspiring migrants. If migrants have cultural values that are more
similar to those of the intended host country, we expect to find heterogeneous selection
patterns across preferred destination types. To deal with this issue, we estimate our model
with a modified dependent variable, distinguish between migration aspirations towards
the OECD member states or towards non-OECD destinations. Furthermore, we perform
several robustness checks by sub-samples, distinguishing between age groups (15-30,
31-45, 45-65), between skill groups (respondents with less than 9 years of education
or more), between employment status (unemployed, employed, out of the labour force),
between gender and marital status(married and unmarried individuals, female and male)
between religious groups (Muslims, Christians, others) and by place of residence (farm,
town and city).
Omitted variables. – Although we control for a traditional set of individual characteris-
tics, migration aspirations can be governed by unobserved characteristics. These omitted
variables can be related to the regional environment of the respondents (e.g., gover-
nance and security in the region, ethnic composition of the population, climatic conditions,
distribution of cultural traits, percentage of natives citizens abroad, etc.), or to their own
characteristics (e.g., cognitive skills and abilities, family ties, etc.). These unobserved
characteristics may jointly affect the acquisition of cultural traits and migration aspirations
(see Bisin and Verdier (1998)). To deal with unobserved region characteristics, we take
22In the post-Arab Spring period, Islamists became dominant in Egypt and Tunisia, and partly in Yemen.
Richards et al. (2014) see two reasons for this. First, the fear of political Islam declined. Second, Islamist
parties propagated on the lack of social justice and corruption under the previous rulers. Initially, their mes-
sages became appealing to the middle class voters. Later, they proliferated due to grassroot movements.
23The correlation between our indicators and cultural questions are presented in Table A6
24This group is referred to as the Main Insurgents. It includes Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen.
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advantage of the fact that GWP identifies the detailed geographical location of the respon-
dent (within the country), and covers several years. For these reasons, we systematically
augment the set of controls with spatial and year (or GWP wave) fixed-effects, and esti-
mate a fixed-effect logit model. Hence, the full set of control variables in Eq. (1) writes
as:
ΓXirt = θr + θt + γxirt,
where θr and θt are the intra-country region and year/wave fixed effects, and γ is the vector
of incidence parameters related to the individual controls.
As for unobserved individual characteristics, disparities in the distribution of covariates
between aspiring migrants and non-migrants may influence the accuracy of our estimates.
As shown by Imbens and Rubin (2012), large distributional gaps magnify the sensitivity of
the estimated coefficients to any ostensibly minor change in the specification. To address
this issue, we use a matching technique. We implement a design phase that precedes
the empirical analysis, and which consists in constructing a balanced sample in terms
of observed covariates. In practice, we match aspiring migrants with non-migrants using
the Mahalanobis Metric Matching method, using all observed covariates to compute the
distance between individuals. A particular property of the Mahalanobis Metric Matching
method is that the resulting set of matches is invariant to affine transformations of the
covariates. Moreover, it generates samples such that the number of aspiring migrants
and non-migrants are equalized in each country. We then conduct our regressions on the
balanced sample, making it more robust and more credible in terms of internal validity.
4 Results
Our empirical analysis follows the structure explained in Section 3. In Section 4.1, we be-
gin by investigating the effect of cultural traits on migration aspirations using fixed-effects
logit regressions, and distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD destinations. In ad-
dition, we check whether similar cultural selection patterns can be identified when consid-
ering short-run migration plans (instead of migration aspirations). Then, in Section 4.2, we
run regressions by subsample to assess whether the effect of culture varies across groups
of individuals; focusing on migration aspirations to OECD member states, we distinguish
between destination countries, between skill groups and between age groups. Section 4.3
describes the results obtained when we use a matched sample of aspiring migrants and
non-migrants. In Section 4.4, we assess whether cultural selection varies across coun-
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tries, using both country-specific regressions and full-sample regressions with interaction
terms. Section 4.5 compares the pre and post-Arab Spring periods. Finally, Section 4.6
summarizes our results and discuss policy issues.
4.1 Logit Regression
Table 4 focuses on migration aspirations and describes the results of the fixed-effect logit
regressions for the full sample of MENA countries and by type of destination. Columns
(1) and (2) report estimates for migration aspirations to all destinations. It shows that
aspirations are affected by religiosity. The coefficient of religiosity is positive (0.416) and
significant at the 1% threshold. The logit model is non linear. To illustrate the magnitude
of this effect, let us define the benchmark category of respondent as males with college
education, aged 24 to 35, married with children, without friends or relatives abroad, and
with a level of religiosity equal to the sample mean (0.229). The same benchmark category
is used below to interpret the results of other regressions. For this category of respondent,
increasing our indicator of religiosity by one standard deviation (+0.297) raises the desire
to emigrate by 8.1 percentage points.25 Note that the mean proportion of aspiring migrants
equals 23.7% in the MENA region. On the contrary, the effect of gender-egalitarian views
is not significantly different from zero. Control variables are usually significant and have
intuitive signs. In line with the literature, aspirations are higher for young, single men with
higher education, with lower level of income per household member, and who have friends
or relatives abroad.
The rest of the table distinguishes between migration aspirations to OECD and to non-
OECD destinations. Columns (5) and (6) reveal that cultural traits have insignificant impact
on migration aspirations to non-OECD countries. On the contrary, low levels of religiosity
and gender-egalitarian views increase intentions to emigrate to OECD destinations, as
shown in Columns (3) and (4). The effect of gender-egalitarian views is relativeley small
and significant at the 10% threshold only. The robustness checks below show that this ef-
fect is not robust across groups of respondents. However, the effect of religiosity is greater
than in column (2) and highly significant. Increasing our indicator by one standard devi-
ation raises the desire to emigrate to OECD destinations by 13.5 percentage points (for
the benchmark category of respondent). Aspirations to migrate to OECD destinations are
even more influenced by education attainment and by the presence of network members
abroad. Hence, Table 4 evidences that aspiring migrants from MENA countries self-select
25Increasing the religiosity index implies reducing the level of religiosity
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Table 4: Logit regressions - Full sample 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations by destination type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination All All OECD OECD non OECD non OECD
Culture 0.062 0.416*** 0.190* 0.509*** -0.072 0.258
(0.110) (0.104) (0.115) (0.093) (0.159) (0.170)
Female -0.674*** -0.572*** -0.761*** -0.675*** -0.601*** -0.408***
(0.121) (0.105) (0.120) (0.102) (0.164) (0.156)
Network 0.694*** 0.628*** 0.745*** 0.704*** 0.702*** 0.539***
(0.076) (0.069) (0.105) (0.088) (0.080) (0.074)
Age -0.286*** -0.249*** -0.313*** -0.293*** -0.259*** -0.186***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.054) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Education 0.186*** 0.128 0.269** 0.250** 0.078 -0.007
(0.059) (0.079) (0.105) (0.126) (0.076) (0.078)
Marital -0.247*** -0.393*** -0.367*** -0.486*** -0.140** -0.281**
(0.063) (0.095) (0.073) (0.088) (0.062) (0.109)
Children -0.008 0.009 0.011 -0.001 -0.014 0.029
(0.074) (0.042) (0.108) (0.040) (0.076) (0.076)
Income -0.009** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.013** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Income2 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.277** -0.163** -1.986*** -1.305*** -0.546*** -0.647***
(0.129) (0.081) (0.159) (0.107) (0.114) (0.107)
Observations 29,500 31,281 25,689 27,368 25,555 26,295
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.110 0.104 0.161 0.170 0.103 0.0974
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. OECD
destinations: US, UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hun-
gary, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, Israel, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South
Korea, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Japan, Mexico, Belgium, Turkey, Iceland, Ire-
land, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland, Czech Rep.
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Table 5: Logit regressions - Full sample 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration plans to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Int Mig Plan Mig Int Mig Plan Mig
Culture Gend Gend Rel Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD
Culture 0.190* -0.068 0.509*** 0.832***
(0.115) (0.173) (0.093) (0.235)
Female -0.761*** -0.583*** -0.675*** -1.103***
(0.120) (0.154) (0.102) (0.187)
Network 0.745*** 1.072*** 0.704*** 1.963***
(0.105) (0.219) (0.088) (0.268)
Age -0.313*** -0.207** -0.293*** -0.397***
(0.054) (0.103) (0.041) (0.097)
Education 0.269** 0.204 0.250** -0.222
(0.105) (0.133) (0.126) (0.189)
Marital -0.367*** -0.335*** -0.486*** -0.205
(0.073) (0.106) (0.088) (0.169)
Children 0.011 -0.130 -0.001 -0.220*
(0.108) (0.108) (0.040) (0.114)
Income -0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Income2 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.986*** -3.592*** -1.305*** -3.711***
(0.159) (0.189) (0.107) (0.170)
Observations 25,689 10,860 27,368 12,231
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.161 0.158 0.170 0.231
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std.
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Std. errors are clustered at the country level. OECD
destinations. Dep. Var.: intention to migrate (Int Mig);
plan to migrate in the next 12 months (Plan Mig)
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along cultural traits but only when they intend to migrate to an OECD destination; they
exhibit lower levels of religiosity than those who do not intend to migrate.26
In Table 5, we check whether similar selection patterns apply to individual who have
concrete migration plans, i.e. those who are taking concrete steps to leave their country
within the next 12 months. Columns (1) and (3) report the results from Table 4 for mi-
gration aspirations. Relying on the same specification, Columns (2) and (4) provides the
results for migration plans. Column (2) shows that the effect of gender-egalitarian views is
insignificant. On the contrary, the effect of religiosity is highly significant and greater than
for migration aspirations. We obtain a coefficient of 0.832, which means that increasing
our indicator by one standard deviation (+0.297) raises the probability to have concrete
migration plans by 27.6 percentage points. Note that the mean proportion of individuals
taking steps to move within 12 months equals 2.9% and its standard deviation equals 16.7
percentage points. We thus find evidence of an effect of religiosity on migration plans,
implying that emigration to OECD countries affects the distribution of cultural traits in the
population left behind.
4.2 Robustness by subsample
In this section, we investigate whether the identified self-selection patterns vary by country
of destination, by educational level, by gender, and by age group.27 We focus on migra-
tion aspirations to OECD destination countries. We begin by splitting the set of OECD
destinations into three subsets of countries that are frequently reported as preferred des-
tinations in the data, namely the European Union, North America (i.e. Canada and the
United States) and Turkey. Fixed-effect logit regressions are used to explain migration as-
pirations to these three sets of countries. Results are provided in Table 6. Columns (1), (3)
and (5) confirm that the effect of gender-egalitarian views remains insignificant for all sets
of destination (or poorly significant in the case of migration aspirations to North America).
Columns (2) and (4) show that the effect of religiosity is highly significant when consider-
ing OECD, high-income destinations. We also notice that the intensity of the self-selection
26In table A8 in the Appendix we also test whether those results are mostly driven by a deviation from the
average level of culture at the regional level. To do so, we conduct our analysis without fixed effects (or with
country fixed-effects only). Intending migrants always self-select on religiosity, and results are magnified
when individuals deviate from the region/country mean.
27Regressions by employment status and by place of residence give similar results (available upon re-
quest). Results by religious groups are presented in Table A9. We find that the cultural selection process
is driven by the Muslim population. Results by gender and marital status are presented in Table A10.
Interestingly, unmarried women that would like to move to OECD destination countries show more gender-
egalitarian attitudes.
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process is greater for individuals intending to migrate to North America (0.683) than for
those who intend to migrate to Europe (0.468). On the contrary, we find no evidence of
cultural selection towards Turkey.
Table 6: Logit regressions - Robustness by destination country 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination EU EU US/Can US/Can Turk Turk
Culture 0.085 0.468*** 0.261* 0.683*** 0.325 0.179
(0.130) (0.117) (0.153) (0.136) (0.207) (0.272)
Female -0.868*** -0.737*** -0.745*** -0.575*** -0.584 -0.136
(0.116) (0.084) (0.164) (0.130) (0.410) (0.350)
Network 0.669*** 0.727*** 0.968*** 0.724*** 1.160*** 0.691**
(0.143) (0.092) (0.144) (0.090) (0.175) (0.280)
Age -0.354*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.269*** -0.348*** -0.256
(0.052) (0.036) (0.074) (0.053) (0.104) (0.156)
Education 0.191* 0.245** 0.385*** 0.351** 0.113 -0.055
(0.098) (0.124) (0.149) (0.154) (0.198) (0.205)
Marital -0.402*** -0.564*** -0.290*** -0.383*** -0.255* -0.585**
(0.073) (0.088) (0.100) (0.089) (0.137) (0.246)
Children -0.024 -0.064 0.016 0.031 0.205 0.362
(0.095) (0.071) (0.118) (0.111) (0.189) (0.220)
Income -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.006*** -0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.019) (0.014)
Income2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.837*** -1.723*** -4.411*** -2.294*** -3.970*** -4.661***
(0.151) (0.188) (0.116) (0.161) (0.385) (0.494)
Observations 22,570 24,733 22,018 22,780 10,699 11,347
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.182 0.203 0.141 0.137 0.181 0.126
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. Col.
(1) and (2): European destinations that are member states of the OECD; Col. (2)
and (3): US and Canada; Col. (5) and (6) Turkey.
Coming back to the whole set of OECD countries, Table 7 investigates whether cultural
selection varies across skill and gender groups. In Columns (1) and (2), we report results
for men only. We find that men self-select more than the whole population. The coefficient
22
on religiosity reaches 0.716 for men, to be compared with 0.509 for the whole population
(see Table 4). Then, splitting men across skill groups reveals that cultural selection does
not vary with education. The coefficient for highly educated men equals 0.722 in Column
(6), against 0.793 for less educated men in Column (4). The results also indicate that mi-
gration aspirations of highly educated men are less influenced by age and by the presence
of network members abroad.
Table 7: Logit regressions - Robustness by skill group 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Group Men Men Men LS Men LS Men HS Men HS
Culture 0.264 0.716*** 0.160 0.793*** 0.352* 0.722***
(0.161) (0.094) (0.196) (0.246) (0.183) (0.107)
Network 0.734*** 0.606*** 0.810*** 0.770*** 0.684*** 0.501***
(0.116) (0.105) (0.128) (0.191) (0.149) (0.120)
Age -0.345*** -0.273*** -0.390*** -0.379*** -0.298*** -0.197***
(0.061) (0.049) (0.079) (0.084) (0.055) (0.044)
Education 0.224** 0.068
(0.093) (0.151)
Marital -0.379*** -0.637*** -0.346*** -0.534*** -0.461*** -0.739***
(0.088) (0.117) (0.130) (0.153) (0.080) (0.126)
Children -0.007 0.028 -0.076 -0.071 0.018 0.044
(0.125) (0.070) (0.183) (0.169) (0.119) (0.056)
Income -0.006 -0.005 -0.019 -0.000 0.005 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
Income2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.084*** -0.939*** -2.225*** -2.144*** -1.437*** 0.336**
(0.139) (0.147) (0.243) (0.334) (0.108) (0.143)
Observations 12,809 13,744 5,086 4,903 7,286 8,515
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.158 0.169 0.188 0.224 0.144 0.145
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. des-
tinations: same as Table 4. Col. (3) and (4): men with less than 9 years of
education. Col. (5) and (6): men with at least 9 years of education.
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Table 8: Logit regressions - Robustness by age group 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Age 15-30 15-30 31-45 31-45 46-65 46-65
Culture 0.332** 0.448*** -0.128 0.620*** 0.207 0.508**
(0.131) (0.110) (0.220) (0.123) (0.284) (0.217)
Female -0.866*** -0.704*** -0.738*** -0.687*** -0.368*** -0.528***
(0.111) (0.109) (0.181) (0.117) (0.140) (0.138)
Network 0.827*** 0.743*** 0.671*** 0.762*** 0.564*** 0.388***
(0.127) (0.099) (0.096) (0.144) (0.188) (0.101)
Age -0.209*** -0.249*** -0.214* -0.270*** -0.479** -0.434***
(0.077) (0.069) (0.113) (0.072) (0.191) (0.121)
Education 0.201 0.224 0.325*** 0.231* 0.380** 0.306**
(0.148) (0.149) (0.095) (0.135) (0.158) (0.134)
Marital -0.423*** -0.455*** -0.198 -0.543*** 0.086 -0.211
(0.094) (0.068) (0.149) (0.126) (0.226) (0.265)
Children 0.015 0.026 -0.280 0.025 0.468** -0.068
(0.126) (0.068) (0.187) (0.129) (0.226) (0.169)
Income 0.001 -0.003 -0.012 -0.020*** -0.017 -0.007
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
Income2 -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.979*** -1.201*** -1.710*** -3.049*** -1.967*** -0.449
(0.137) (0.127) (0.335) (0.206) (0.725) (0.644)
Observations 11,927 12,493 7,659 8,433 4,235 4,806
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.170 0.163 0.156 0.150 0.145 0.149
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. OECD
destinations: same as Table 4.
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Finally, Table 8 reports results by age group, distinguishing between individuals aged
15 to 30, those aged 31 to 45, and those aged 46 to 65. Selection by religiosity is sig-
nificant for all age groups, and the estimated coefficient increases with age. As far as
gender-egalitarian views are concerned, the coefficient is insignificant for individuals aged
31 and over. However, it is significant (at the 5% threshold) and positive (0.332) for indi-
viduals aged 15 to 30, i.e. for the group of respondents who are the most likely to realize
their migration aspirations. Overall, we find evidence of a robust selection process by
cultural traits. Selection by religiosity is obtained for all groups, while selection by gender-
egalitarian attitudes is obtained for the young population.
4.3 Using matched samples
We now investigate whether our results are driven by differences in the composition of
the samples of aspiring migrants and non-migrants. In line with comparisons between
treated and control groups, we use the Mahalanobis Metric Matching technique to identify
samples of aspiring migrants and non-migrants that are balanced in terms of covariates.
The matching procedure minimizes the Mahalanobis metric. For each covariate x , we
compute the normalized difference:28
∆x = (x¯Mig − x¯SNon)
(
s2x,Mig + s
2
x,Non
2
)−1/2
where the difference between the mean value of the covariate for aspiring migrants and
non-migrants, x¯Mig− x¯Non, is divided by the mean of the standard deviations of the covari-
ate over the whole sample (sx,Mig and sx,Non).
Results of the matching technique are described in Table 9. For each sample, we re-
port the difference in terms of covariates before and after the matching procedure. Before
matching, the distribution of covariates is unbalanced for both samples; differences in
characterstics are always statistically different from zero. On the contrary, the matching
technique allows generating a matched sample exhibiting a balanced distribution of covari-
ates. After matching, the only variable along which aspiring migrants and non-migrants
exhibit statistically different outcomes is the level of income per household member.
Table 10 provides the results of the fixed-effect logit regressions using the matched
samples; they can be easily compared to those of Table 4 for the non-matched samples.
28Since some individuals did not answer all questions on religiosity and gender-egalitarian views, we
decide to perform a specific matching procedure for each regression
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Table 9: Mahalanobis matching procedure 2007-2011
Matched and non-matched samples
Non-matched Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean s.d. Diff. P-val Mean s.d. Diff. P-val
Religiosity
Gender 0,51 0,00 39,49 0,00 0,44 0,01 0,73 0,71
Network 0,20 0,00 47,94 0,00 0,26 0,00 2,92 0,14
Age 33,43 0,08 -60,17 0,00 30,63 0,13 0,24 0,91
Marital 0,57 0,00 -62,44 0,00 0,47 0,01 -0,75 0,71
Children 0,74 0,00 14,05 0,00 0,72 0,00 1,50 0,45
Income 10821 89,02 7,49 0,01 11168 176,13 4,49 0,02
Education 0,47 0,00 33,52 0,00 0,52 0,01 1,28 0,52
Gender views
Gender 0,51 0,00 -46,69 0,00 0,43 0,01 -0,32 0,87
Network 0,24 0,00 50,19 0,00 0,30 0,01 0,56 0,78
Age 33,24 0,08 -62,78 0,00 30,17 0,13 -0,20 0,92
Marital 0,58 0,00 -57,22 0,00 0,49 0,01 0,44 0,83
Children 0,74 0,00 -12,37 0,00 0,73 0,00 -0,13 0,95
Income 11410 87,38 19,84 0,00 12390 172,22 3,87 0,05
Education 0,44 0,00 43,40 0,00 0,52 0,01 0,24 0,91
The difference (Diff) between intending migrants’ average covariate and intending
stayers is divided by the std. error.
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Table 10: Logit regressions - Matched samples of migrants and non-migrants 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations by destination type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination All All OECD OECD non OECD non OECD
Culture 0.121 0.347*** 0.210 0.521*** 0.022 0.067
(0.130) (0.118) (0.146) (0.113) (0.176) (0.164)
Female -0.050 -0.025 -0.183** -0.152* 0.084 0.149*
(0.044) (0.038) (0.078) (0.084) (0.078) (0.088)
Network 0.003 0.040 0.020 0.131* 0.019 -0.058
(0.041) (0.045) (0.063) (0.068) (0.054) (0.044)
Age -0.017 0.005 -0.034 -0.036*** 0.005 0.052*
(0.015) (0.012) (0.030) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028)
Education -0.045 -0.027 0.100 0.131 -0.172** -0.208***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.088) (0.095) (0.086) (0.079)
Marital 0.044* 0.005 -0.046 0.011 0.119*** -0.015
(0.025) (0.036) (0.044) (0.051) (0.041) (0.056)
Children -0.001 0.073*** -0.005 0.064* -0.010 0.110
(0.032) (0.028) (0.073) (0.039) (0.060) (0.067)
Income 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.004 -0.005 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Income2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.136** -0.298*** -2.518*** -1.807*** 0.008 -0.608***
(0.069) (0.076) (0.138) (0.091) (0.082) (0.154)
Observations 9,736 11,034 7,228 8,415 7,179 7,757
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.0483 0.0377 0.101 0.0865 0.0808 0.0849
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. OECD
destinations: same as Table 4.
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All conclusions of the benchmark regressions hold when using the matched samples.
Columns (1) and (2) confirm that aspiring migrants self-select in terms of religiosity, but
not along gender-egalitarian attitudes. Column (4) and (6) confirm that the results are
driven by migration aspirations to OECD destination countries only. The coefficient of
religiosity equals 0.521 and is significant at the 1% threshold; it is almost identical to that
of Table 4. Increasing the indicator of religiosity by one standard deviation raises the desire
to emigrate 13.3 percentage points.29
4.4 Heterogeneity across countries
We now explore whether cultural selection varies across countries or with country-specific
characteristics. The set of country characteristics includes the shares of Sunnis and Shi-
ites among the Muslim population, the log of GDP per capita, two indicators of institutional
quality, and the share of native citizens from the same origin country living in a OECD
country member state, as a proxy of network abroad. Figure 2 plots the coefficient of
religiosity obtained from country-specific regressions against the level of country charac-
teristics; it also shows the linear trend between them. It evidences large variations across
countries, both in the size of the estimated coefficient and in its confidence interval. Such
variations can be explained by differences in sample size or by more structural factors.
However, the correlation between the estimated coefficients and country characteristics is
always insignificant, except when considering the share of Shiites in the Muslim popula-
tion. In the latter case, the correlation is positive (0.514). The same exercise is conducted
for gender-egalitarian attitudes in Figure 3. It reveals a negative correlation between the
estimated effect of culture and two country characteristics, namely the share of Sunnis in
the Muslim population (0.515) and the control of corruption (0.582).
To generalize this descriptive analysis of correlations, we run regressions accounting
for the interactions between country characteristics and cultural traits. Results are pro-
vided in Table 11. Overall, the interaction between progessive views on religiosity and
country characteristics is never significant, even when considering the interaction with the
share of Shiites in the Muslim population. In addition, the effect of religiosity remains sig-
nificant in all specifications (except when controlling for corruption in Column (3)). This
reinforces our conclusion that aspiring migrants from virtually all MENA countries self-
29As before, this effect on migration aspirations is computed for the benchmark group, which consists of
male individuals without friends or relatives abroad, with college education, married with children, between
24 to 35 years old, and with an average level of religiosity (0.229).
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select along religiosity levels. As far as gender-egalitarian attitudes are concerned, the
results in Column (1) suggest that aspiring migrants from countries with a Sunni majority
have less progressive views. This is confirmed in Column (2) which reports a positive
coefficient for the interaction between cultural traits and the share of Shiites. Selection
along gender-egalitarian views also becomes significant when controlling for the aggre-
gate share of native citizens living abroad, a proxy for openness to migration.
Table 11: Logit regressions - Accounting for origin-country characteristics 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Interaction Sunnis Shiites Cont. Corr. Rule Law ln GDP Net.
Religiosity
Culture 0.322** 0.538*** 0.235 0.471** 0.570*** 0.417***
(0.148) (0.143) (0.153) (0.196) (0.174) (0.128)
Interaction 0.003 -0.001 1.042 0.003 -0.000 2.397
(0.003) (0.003) (0.830) (0.389) (0.000) (1.525)
Observations 27,368 27,368 24,471 24,471 27,368 27,368
Partial R2 0.171 0.172 0.180 0.178 0.172 0.173
Gender-egal.
Culture 0.903*** 0.033 0.613* 0.531 0.114 0.314**
(0.299) (0.113) (0.351) (0.388) (0.159) (0.130)
Interaction -0.010*** 0.016*** -1.717 -0.828 0.000 -4.936*
(0.004) (0.006) (1.241) (0.815) (0.000) (2.784)
Observations 25,689 25,689 24,221 24,221 25,689 25,689
Partial R2 0.163 0.165 0.168 0.167 0.163 0.164
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses;***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We control for gender, network, age cohort, level
of education,marital status, presence of children, income, income squared, year-
wave and region f.e. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. OECD desti-
nations: same as Table 4
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(a) Sunnis - (Corr = −0.288) (b) Shiites - (Corr = 0.514∗∗∗)
(c) Rule of Law - (Corr = −0.187) (d) Control of Corruption - (Corr = −0.024)
(e) ln GDP - (Corr = 0.375) (f) Network - (Corr = 0.254)
Figure 2: Religiosity: estimated βˆ and its 95% interval of confidence by country
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(a) Sunnis - (Corr = −0.515∗∗) (b) Shiites - (Corr = 0.455)
(c) Rule of Law - (Corr= −0.438) (d) Control of Corruption - (Corr = −0.582∗∗)
(e) ln GDP - (Corr= −0.072) (f) Network - (Corr= −0.361)
Figure 3: Gender-egalitarian views: estimated βˆ and its 95% interval of confidence by
country
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4.5 Effect of the Arab Spring
We finally explore whether the link between cultural traits and migration has been affected
by the Arab Spring. Since most questions on religiosity and gender-egalitarian views are
asked from 2007 to 2011, we use the only proxy for religiosity that is available in all waves
of the GWP (2007-2016). The question is: Is religion an important part of your daily life?
Responses to this question are highly correlated with the synthetic indicator of religiosity
resulting from our two-stage PCA.
Table 12: Logit regressions - Accounting for the Arab Spring 2007-2016
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Sample Full Full Full Matched Matched Matched
Countries All Main Ins. Others All Main Ins. Others
Religiosity 0.473*** 0.560*** 0.409*** 0.446*** 0.559*** 0.396***
(0.080) (0.088) (0.116) (0.062) (0.108) (0.082)
Interaction -0.110 -0.475** 0.081 -0.149 -0.425* 0.010
(0.177) (0.215) (0.203) (0.173) (0.244) (0.228)
Observations 100,544 34,914 65,630 41,801 14,328 27,473
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.139 0.170 0.127 0.142 0.173 0.131
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We control for gender, network, age cohort, level of
education, marital status, presence of income squared, the interaction terms with
individual controls and Arab Spring, children, income, and region f.e.. Std. errors
are clustered at the country level. Sample legend: Full Sample (FS); Matched on
After Arab Spring (Matched). OECD destinations: same as Table 4
We run fixed-effect logit regressions accounting for the interactions between a post-
Arab Spring dummy (equal to one for the years 2011 to 2016) and religiosity. Results are
provided in Table 12, which distinguishes between the full sample of MENA countries, the
Main Insurgents (i.e., Algeria, Egyp, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen), and the other countries.
Columns (1) to (3) use the full sample; Columns (4) to (6) use matched samples of of the
population, matched on the post-Arab Spring period.30
In all specifications, selection by religiosity is always positive and significant. Although
30We match individual pre-post Arab Spring. Results of the matching are available in Table A11
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the Arab Spring has not affected the intensity of cultural selection in the less affected
countries, it has reduced it in the Main Insurgent countries. The latter findings are highly
robust to the use of matching techniques. In other words, the Arab Spring has increased
the relative religiosity of aspiring migrants. The data do not allow us to investigate whether
the degree of cultural selection has changed after the recent conflicts and political unrest
in the Middle-East. Given similarities with the Arab Spring period, it is however plausible
that the 2015 wave of asylum seekers is less culturally selected than previous migration
waves.
4.6 Discussion and policy issues
Our empirical results indicate that individuals who intend to emigrate to OECD, high-
income countries exhibit significantly lower levels of religiosity than the rest of the pop-
ulation. They also share more gender-egalitarian views, although this effect only holds
among the young. Potentially, these results have implications from the point of view of
both origin and destination countries.
From the point of view of destination countries, selection on religiosity and gender-
egalitarian attitudes implies that the cultural distance between migrants and host country
citizens is smaller than between the country populations. This means easier integration to
the host country labor market and social norms. Selective migration from MENA to high
income OECD countries should be less of a concern from the point of view of the OECD
member states. On the one hand, informing public opinion in this regard might influence
attitudes towards immigration and discrimination practices; this seems a relevant policy
recommendation. On the other hand, the effect of cultural selection should not be over-
estimated. Figure 4(a) compares the average level of religiosity of OECD natives (0.612)
with the average level of intending stayers, of intending migrants towards OECD destina-
tions, and of current migrants from MENA countries in the OECD. When considering all
respondents, the religiosity index of intending migrants (0.259) is 15% higher than that of
intending stayers (0.225). Remember, zero corresponds to the maximal religiosity level.
Hence, self-selection along religiosity levels reduces the gap between MENA and OECD
countries by 9% only. Similar findings are found when comparing young intended migrants
and non-migrants. When considering highly educated respondents, the average religios-
ity index is slightly greater (0.279) but cultural differences between intended migrants and
non-migrants become negligible.31 The Gallup data also enable us to compare actual
31We identify a significant effect of religiosity and gender-egalitarian views on migration aspirations of
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migrants from MENA countries (those who have already migrated) with OECD native citi-
zens. Figure 4(a) shows that the religiosity index of actual migrants is much closer to that
of natives, and this is especially true for older migrants and for the highly educated. The
gap between actual and intended migrants can be due to several reasons: (i) cultural se-
lection in the realization of migration aspirations (in line with Table 5), (ii) a gradual decline
in cultural selection over time (in line with our findings about the Arab Spring, see Table
12), (iii) a sign of cultural assimilation abroad, (iv) estimation biases due to the underrep-
resentation of the foreign-born population in the survey (the Gallup survey only includes
282 immigrants from the MENA in the OECD countries). As for gender-egalitarian views,
data for OECD countries are not available. Figure 4(b) shows that intended migrants are
slightly more progressive, an effect that is mostly driven by the young population (in line
with Table 8). On average, selection on gender-egalitarian views is small. In sum, despite
cultural selection, immigrants from the MENA countries exhibit markedly different cultural
traits compared to OECD natives.
From the point of view of the home country, the distribution of cultural traits in the pop-
ulation left behind tends to be skewed towards more religiosity and less gender-egalitarian
attitudes. Emigration to OECD countries impacts the distribution of cultural traits among
those left behind, with potential implications for modernization, growth and democracy.
On this basis, it could be argued that emigration should be combated if the home-country
government targets to achieve a higher level of economic development. Our results do
not support this view. Religiosity and gender-egalitarian attitudes are correlated with other
observed and unobserved characteristics that affect migration aspirations. Figure 4(c)
compares the observed average indices of religiosity and gender-egalitarian view of the
current MENA population (in blue), with those obtained if all intended migration had left
their country (in red), or if all young intended migrants had left (in green). Given the pro-
portion of intended migrants towards OECD countries (12,3% on average) and the small
cultural differences between groups, the average cultural traits of the population left behind
hardly changes under these two counterfactuals. In addition, emigration towards OECD
countries could even reverse the effect on average cultural traits of the selection effect
if migrants abroad transfer more progressive norms and beliefs to their home country,
as argued in Rapoport et al. (2017). In sum, despite cultural selection, emigration from
the MENA countries is unlikely to induce negative effects on modernization, growth and
democracy.
highly educated individuals (see Table 7). However, this effect is dominated by other distributional charac-
teristics of the highly educated population.
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(a) Religiosity Index (migrants vs non-migrants) (b) Gender-Egal. Index (migrants vs non-migrants)
(c) Cultural traits in the MENA
Figure 4: Average Cultural Indexes across groups and simulations
The graph shows the mean level of religiosity and gender-egalitaria views of the intending stayers
(Stayers), intending migrants towards OECD (Int. Mig) and the migrants already in the OECD (MENA
Migrants (OECD)) on panels (a) and (b). The vertical black line is the mean level of religiosity of natives in
the OECD on panel (a), and a society sharing fully gender-egalitarian views on panel (b). The means are
computed for four groups: the overall population (All), the population between 15 and 30 (Young), the
population with at least 9 year of education (Educated) and the young population with high education
(Young and Educated). Panel (c) shows the mean level of religiosity and gender-egalitarian views of the
whole population, of intending stayers, and of the whole population minus young intending migrants.
Author’s calculations based on Gallup World Poll and World Bank Data.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we use a unique database on migration aspirations, opinions and beliefs in
the MENA countries to test whether migrants positively select by culture traits. We conduct
fixed-effect logit regressions using the full sample or using matched samples of aspiring
migrants and non-migrants. We find that aspiring migrants in general, and those who
have concrete migration plans to migrate in particular, are culturally selected, and that this
selection on cultural traits depends on the type of preferred destination. Intended migrants
to OECD, high-income countries exhibit lower level of religiosity. This result is robust
across gender, age groups and education levels. As far as attitude towards women’s
rights are concerned, aspiring migrants have more gender-egalitarian views in the age
group 15-30, when they are single women, or when they originate from countries with
a Sunni minority. Finally, we find a robust effect of the Arab Spring on the intensity of
cultural selection only in countries highly impacted by the Arab Spring. In these countries,
the Arab Spring has decreased the degree of cultural selection.
These results have implications from the point of view of both origin and destination
countries. From the point of view of destination countries, cultural selection implies that
the cultural distance between migrants and host country citizens is smaller than between
the country populations. From the point of view of the home country, the distribution of
cultural traits in the population left behind tends to be skewed towards more religiosity and
less gender-egalitarian attitudes, with potential implications for modernization, growth and
democracy. However, the aggregate effects of cultural selection are limited, albeit non
negligible. Selective emigration has limited effects on the distribution of cultural traits in
the MENA countries, and on the cultural distance between natives and immigrants in the
OECD countries. To quantify the impact of emigration on culture, these effects should
be compared with those linked to ex-post transfers of norms and beliefs from diasporas
abroad to those left behind. Further research on such transfers of cultural norms and
beliefs is on our agenda.
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Appendices
A1: List of intended destinations
Table A1: Top-5 preferred OECD destinations
Origin 1st best 2nd best 3rd best 4th best 5th best
Afghanistan United States Germany Canada UK Turkey
Algeria France Canada UK Italy Spain
Azerbaijan Turkey Germany United States UK France
Chad United States France Canada UK Japan
Egypt United States Italy France Germany UK
Iran Canada United States Germany Australia UK
Iraq Sweden United States UK Germany Canada
Jordan United States Canada Germany Sweden Turkey
Lebanon Canada United States Australia France Germany
Mali France United States Spain Canada Germany
Mauritania France United States Spain Canada Germany
Morocco France Spain Italy Canada United States
Niger United States France Belgium Canada Germany
Palestine United States Sweden Canada Norway Germany
Syria United States Canada Sweden Germany Turkey
Tunisia France Italy Germany Canada United States
Yemen United States UK Turkey Canada Germany
1
Table A2: Top-5 preferred non-OECD destinations
Origin 1st best 2nd best 3rd best 4th best 5th best
Afghanistan Iran Saudi Arabia Pakistan UAE Tajikistan
Algeria UAE Saudi Arabia Egypt Other Qatar
Azerbaijan Russia Ukraine Iran Egypt India
Chad Nigeria Cameoon Saudi Arabia Sudan Senegal
Egypt Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Libya Jordan
Iran UAE Other Malaysia Jordan Russia
Iraq UAE Syria Lebanon Other Egypt
Jordan UAE Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar Palestine
Lebanon UAE Saudi Arabia Qatar Kuwait South Africa
Mali Ivory Coast Angola China Equatorial Guinea South Africa
Mauritania UAE Morocco Saudi Arabia Senegal Qatar
Morocco Saudi Arabia UAE Russia Egypt Qatar
Niger Nigeria Ivory Coast Ghana Libya Togo
Palestine UAE Saudi Arabia Jordan Egypt Other
Syria UAE Saudi Arabia Qatar Kuwait Lebanon
Tunisia UAE Saudi Arabia Libya Other Qatar
Yemen Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar Egypt Other
A2: Principal Component Analysis
Table A3: Principal components eigenvectors
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Comp8 Comp9 Comp10 Comp11 Comp12
Violence1 0.1993 0.1780 -0.6297 0.1006 0.0923 -0.0041 0.1730 -0.0043 0.0800 -0.0444 0.4751 0.4994
Violence2 0.2347 0.1712 -0.6178 0.0552 0.1167 0.0894 -0.0104 0.1347 0.0074 -0.0028 -0.4307 -0.5527
Religiosity1 0.1947 -0.1960 0.1783 0.6362 0.1472 0.1862 0.2923 -0.0512 -0.0507 -0.5778 -0.0792 -0.0065
Religiosity2 0.3190 -0.2829 0.0588 0.4016 0.2078 0.2810 -0.4184 -0.0532 0.0191 0.5824 0.1172 0.0124
Generosity1 -0.0125 0.5235 0.2242 0.1520 0.0940 0.0432 -0.1850 0.0720 0.7684 -0.0806 0.0471 -0.0568
Generosity2 -0.0309 0.5028 0.1830 0.2790 0.0447 -0.1144 0.5355 -0.1845 -0.2624 0.4692 -0.0050 -0.1001
Generosity3 -0.1006 0.5125 0.0709 0.0224 0.0786 0.3609 -0.4515 0.1384 -0.5436 -0.2237 0.0319 0.1252
Gender1 0.5217 0.1338 0.1105 -0.1957 0.0787 -0.1804 -0.0885 -0.3457 -0.0020 -0.0338 -0.5411 0.4466
Gender2 0.5074 0.0753 0.1614 -0.3100 0.0076 0.0014 -0.0151 -0.3351 -0.0853 -0.1791 0.5102 -0.4500
Gender3 0.4194 0.0011 0.2286 -0.2240 -0.0838 0.2306 0.3018 0.7415 0.0026 0.1042 -0.0050 0.0986
Other1 -0.2056 -0.0649 -0.0188 -0.3469 0.3358 0.7121 0.2923 -0.3016 0.1481 0.0535 -0.0914 0.0591
Other2 -0.0809 -0.0569 0.0826 -0.1207 0.8775 -0.3747 -0.0087 0.2132 -0.0812 -0.0371 0.0638 -0.0303
2
A3: Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table A4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean s.d. Min Max
Migration desire 146680 0.237 0.425 0 1
Plan to Migrate 146680 0.029 0.167 0 1
Religiosity 34906 0.229 0.297 0 1
Gender views 33908 0.697 0.326 0 1
Generosity 142758 0.281 0.287 0 1
Violence 41878 0.858 0.245 0 1
Female 146680 0.487 0.499 0 1
Network 146680 0.259 0.438 0 1
Age 146680 34.38 12.88 16 65
Education 146680 0.584 0.492 0 1
Marital 146680 0.612 0.487 0 1
Children 146680 0.716 0.450 0 1
Income HH 143082 12963 1699 0 1616
Authors’ elaboration on Gallup data.
Table A5: Pearson correlations across variables
Rel Gend Gender Viol Fem Netw Age Educ Marital Child Inc
Religiosity 1.0
Gender views 0.0949* 1.0
Generosity -0.0798* -0.0237* 1.0
Violence -0.002 0.0561* -0.0193* 1.0
Female 0.1714* 0.2685* -0.1003* 0.0242* 1.0
Network -0.0090 0.0563* 0.0686* -0.0088 -0.0159* 1.0
Age -0.0427* -0.0259* 0.0361* 0.0041 -0.0308* -0.0498* 1.0
Education 0.1289* 0.1359* 0.1258* 0.0592* -0.0870* 0.0660* - 0.1759* 1.0
Marital -0.0722* -0.0546* 0.0362* -0.0281* 0.0286* -0.0657* 0.4135* -0.1464* 1.0
Children -0.1351* -0.0971* -0.0237* -0.0372* 0.0032 -0.066* -0.0865* -0.1137* 0.2147* 1.0
Income HH 0.0847* 0.0970* 0.1327* -0.0228* -0.0308* 0.0932* -0.0042* 0.2199* -0.0587* -0.1185* 1.0
Notes: * p<0.05. Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup data.
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Table A6: Pearson correlations across cultural components
Value Relig. Gender Gener. Violence
Religiosity 1 0.781* 0.067* 0.004 -0.025*
Religiosity 2 0.804* 0.079* -0.131* 0.046*
Gender 1 0.090* 0.754* -0.008 0.098*
Gender 2 0.050* 0.755* -0.023* 0.039*
Gender 3 0.075* 0.693* -0.022* -0.018
Generosity 1 -0.050* -0.012 0.698* -0.033*
Generosity 2 -0.024* -0.011 0.613* -0.042*
Generosity 3 -0.082* -0.019* 0.749* 0.019*
Violence 1 -0.009 0.056* -0.007 0.872*
Violence 2 -0.005 0.032* -0.021* 0.859*
Notes: * p<0.01. Source: Authors’ elaboration on Gallup data.
4
A4: Distribution of Values
Figure A1: Gender-egalitarian views
Figure A2: Religiosity
5
Figure A3: Generosity
Figure A4: Use of violence
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A5: Logit Regression: different aggregation for culture
Table A7: Logit regressions - Robustness to different indicators 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Rel Rel Rel Gend Gend Gend
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Aggregation PCA Arthm. Geom. PCA Arthm. Geom.
Culture 0.509*** 0.438*** 0.472*** 0.190* 0.187 0.033
(0.093) (0.091) (0.061) (0.115) (0.117) (0.091)
Female -0.675*** -0.682*** -0.628*** -0.761*** -0.761*** -0.735***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.120) (0.120) (0.123)
Network 0.704*** 0.704*** 0.701*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.748***
(0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104)
Age -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.296*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.312***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Education 0.250** 0.250** 0.247** 0.269** 0.269** 0.276***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Marital -0.486*** -0.486*** -0.491*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.369***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Children -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109)
Income -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Income2 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.305*** -1.302*** -1.268*** -1.986*** -1.980*** -1.927***
(0.107) (0.108) (0.111) (0.159) (0.158) (0.149)
Observations 27,368 27,368 27,368 25,689 25,689 25,689
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.170 0.170 0.169 0.161 0.161 0.160
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country
level. OECD destinations: same as Table 4. Arthm: arithmetic average of
the individual answers. Geom: geometric average.
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A6: Logit Regression: analysis with different fixed effects
Table A8: Logit regressions - Different fixed effects 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Culture Gend Gend Gend Gend Rel Rel Rel Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Culture 0.100 0.200*** 0.179 0.190* 0.303*** 0.324*** 0.547*** 0.509***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.111) (0.115) (0.063) (0.064) (0.101) (0.093)
Female -0.634*** -0.675*** -0.692*** -0.761*** -0.622*** -0.636*** -0.669*** -0.675***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.098) (0.120) (0.039) (0.039) (0.091) (0.102)
Network 0.672*** 0.749*** 0.743*** 0.745*** 0.713*** 0.711*** 0.705*** 0.704***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.083) (0.105) (0.043) (0.043) (0.070) (0.088)
Age -0.248*** -0.270*** -0.310*** -0.313*** -0.231*** -0.245*** -0.292*** -0.293***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.044) (0.054) (0.018) (0.018) (0.042) (0.041)
Education 0.547*** 0.267*** 0.306*** 0.269** 0.377*** 0.249*** 0.287** 0.250**
(0.046) (0.048) (0.110) (0.105) (0.043) (0.045) (0.122) (0.126)
Marital -0.448*** -0.462*** -0.356*** -0.367*** -0.685*** -0.667*** -0.489*** -0.486***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.052) (0.073) (0.045) (0.045) (0.072) (0.088)
Children -0.191*** -0.176*** -0.037 0.011 -0.156*** -0.173*** -0.056 -0.001
(0.044) (0.045) (0.092) (0.108) (0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.040)
Income 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Income2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.390*** -0.271*** -0.250 -1.986*** -1.055*** -0.218** -0.628*** -1.305***
(0.072) (0.090) (0.208) (0.159) (0.061) (0.093) (0.219) (0.107)
Observations 29,775 29,775 29,775 25,689 30,752 30,752 30,752 27,368
Country f.e. No No Yes No No No Yes No
Region f.e. No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year-Wave f.e. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.0843 0.107 0.145 0.161 0.0928 0.100 0.152 0.170
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses are clustered at
country level in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A7: Logit Regression: additional subsamples analysis
Table A9: Logit regressions - Robustness by religious group 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Culture Gend Rel Gend Rel Gend Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Religion Muslims Muslims Christians Christians Others Others
Culture 0.261* 0.486*** -0.542 0.205 0.140 0.786**
(0.149) (0.091) (0.349) (0.154) (0.231) (0.392)
Female -0.804*** -0.742*** -0.630*** -0.676*** -0.654*** -0.518***
(0.159) (0.140) (0.136) (0.128) (0.067) (0.116)
Network 0.779*** 0.747*** 0.457*** 0.280 0.790* 0.745***
(0.093) (0.086) (0.132) (0.188) (0.465) (0.249)
Age -0.361*** -0.341*** -0.226*** -0.117*** -0.160 -0.253***
(0.058) (0.060) (0.020) (0.043) (0.106) (0.065)
Education 0.245*** 0.280** 0.631** 0.189 0.264* -0.009
(0.087) (0.111) (0.266) (0.482) (0.142) (0.100)
Marital -0.399*** -0.448*** -0.180* -0.154 -0.264** -0.725***
(0.091) (0.077) (0.108) (0.235) (0.125) (0.150)
Children 0.117 -0.092 0.037 0.125 -0.272*** 0.169
(0.132) (0.070) (0.153) (0.095) (0.093) (0.119)
Income -0.005 -0.004 -0.022*** 0.012*** -0.001 -0.015**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Income2 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.973*** -1.146*** 2.458*** -1.335*** -0.692 -1.297***
(0.184) (0.146) (0.223) (0.478) (0.551) (0.410)
Observations 20,097 21,518 1,990 1,952 3,515 3,718
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.189 0.180 0.107 0.104 0.111 0.136
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. Mus-
lims and Christians takes into account all the confessions of each religion. Others
is a residual (not Muslim, not Christian)
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Table A10: Logit regressions - Robustness by gender and marital status 2007-2011
Dependent = Migration aspirations to OECD destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Culture Gend Gend Gend Gend Rel Rel Rel Rel
Destination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Marital Status Single Single Married Married Single Single Married Married
Culture 0.338 0.478** 0.146 -0.063 0.635*** 0.103 0.862*** 0.385
(0.230) (0.237) (0.146) (0.287) (0.096) (0.260) (0.171) (0.245)
Network 0.853*** 0.784*** 0.583*** 0.760*** 0.624*** 0.921*** 0.573*** 0.723***
(0.112) (0.155) (0.140) (0.170) (0.138) (0.186) (0.080) (0.091)
Age -0.397*** -0.275*** -0.309*** -0.319*** -0.308*** -0.275*** -0.239*** -0.299***
(0.075) (0.042) (0.063) (0.096) (0.042) (0.066) (0.081) (0.080)
Education 0.233* 0.306 0.176 0.448*** 0.038 0.585*** 0.152 0.489**
(0.134) (0.216) (0.111) (0.163) (0.168) (0.177) (0.167) (0.196)
Children -0.130 0.207 0.094 -0.186 -0.015 0.112 -0.019 -0.277**
(0.165) (0.197) (0.124) (0.149) (0.097) (0.125) (0.149) (0.121)
Income -0.002 0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.013* -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Income2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.264*** -3.838*** -0.877** -2.244*** -0.681*** -3.890*** -2.604*** -1.860***
(0.172) (0.189) (0.377) (0.347) (0.204) (0.308) (0.238) (0.308)
Observations 4,861 4,125 7,388 6,618 5,520 4,825 7,879 6,882
Region f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Wave f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.149 0.140 0.131 0.167 0.117 0.163 0.132 0.152
Source: Author’s calculations on Gallup Data. Std. errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Std. errors are clustered at the country level. We run our analysis on
gender (Male, Female) and marital status (Single, Married)
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A8: Arab Spring Covariates Distribution - Full sample and
Matched sample
Table A11: Before and After Arab spring Covariates distribution
Matched and non-matched samples
Non-matched Sample Matched Sample
Variables Average Std Error Diff. P-value Average Std Error Diff. P-value
Gender 0,506 0,002 2,249 0,272 0,505 0,003 -2,597 0,194
Network 0,245 0,001 65,893 0,000 0,226 0,002 0,299 0,881
Age 33,660 0,044 5,676 0,005 33,739 0,071 -1,231 0,538
Marital 0,589 0,002 17,711 0,000 0,581 0,003 -4,797 0,016
Children 0,729 0,001 10,296 0,000 0,714 0,002 -1,573 0,431
Income 11577 49,101 11,885 0,000 11676 72,885 6,618 0,001
Education 0,460 0,002 -35,998 0,000 0,457 0,003 7,497 0,000
The difference individuals between average covariates of individuals before and after the
Arab Spring is divided by the std error.
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